Abstract. Left/right ''fixed'' responses to arrow targets are influenced by whether a masked arrow prime is congruent or incongruent with the required target response. Left/right ''free-choice'' responses on trials with ambiguous targets that are mixed among fixed trials are also influenced by masked arrow primes. We show that the magnitude of masked priming of both fixed and free-choice responses is greater when the proportion of fixed trials with congruent primes is .8 rather than .2. Unconscious manipulation of context can thus influence both fixed and free choices. Sequential trial analyses revealed that these effects of the overall prime context on fixed and free-choice priming can be modulated by the local context (i.e., the nature of the previous trial). Our results support accounts of masked priming that posit a memory-recruitment, activation, or decision process that is sensitive to aspects of both the local and global context.
Masked priming occurs when the latency or accuracy of a response to a target is influenced by the prior presentation of a prime of which the subject is unaware. Primes and targets can be words, numbers, shapes, or arrows, but in each case the stimuli are usually unambiguous: Each warrants a particular ''fixed'' response that is either correct or incorrect. For example, if the target is a left-pointing arrow, then only a left response is correct. Several studies using arrow stimuli (e.g., Klapp, 2007; Klapp & Hinkley, 2002; Kiesel et al., 2006; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) have shown that at very brief prime-target SOAs, responses on these fixed trials are facilitated when the prime and target point in the same direction (i.e., are congruent) relative to when they point in opposite directions (i.e., are incongruent). This result is termed a positive compatibility (here, congruence) effect (PCE).
Masked priming paradigms have extensively been used to make claims about the mechanisms that underlie automatic response biases (for a review, see Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2007) . However, decisions about targets are not always fixed. Rather, many decisions are free choices between alternatives. For example, when selecting which brand of cola to buy, one option is not more accurate than another. Whether free choices, like fixed choices, are influenced by masked primes has only been explored recently. Our study contributes to this exploration by testing whether fixed and free choices are similarly influenced by a list-wide manipulation of the masked-prime context. Klapp and Hinkley (2002, Experiment 5) were the first to examine free-choice masked priming, as a means of investigating the breadth of the negative compatibility (here, congruence) effect (NCE). An NCE occurs when responses are faster after incongruent primes than after congruent primes. This surprising interference effect usually occurs at prime-target SOAs above %100 ms, whereas facilitation from congruent primes (i.e., a PCE) usually occurs at much shorter prime-target SOAs (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000) . In Klapp and Hinkley's experiment, ''either-way'' trials, in which participants responded to an ambiguous target (< >) with a free choice of a left or right response, were mixed among trials with fixed targets (<< or >>). Participants selected the prime-incongruent response on 61% of the free-choice trials, and they were also 28 ms faster to respond when their free choice was incongruent with the prime, thus providing two examples of NCEs on free choices. In contrast, at a shorter SOA, Kiesel et al. (2006) found PCEs on both fixed and free-choice priming. With arrow-like stimuli, the primed response was chosen on 59% of the free-choice trials, and these responses were chosen 18-33 ms faster than nonprimed responses. Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004) replicated the NCE on free choices and added two new results. First, free-choice priming occurred only when free-choice trials were mixed with fixed trials (see also Klapp & Haas, 2005) , suggesting that the immediate list context has a strong influence on prime use. Second, they found PCEs on fixed and free choices at a 0-ms SOA, but NCEs at a 150-ms SOA. Masked arrow primes thus induce a congruent-response bias that is reversed at longer SOAs (i.e., an ''activationfollowed-by-inhibition'' pattern). Schlaghecken and Eimer suggest that it may be adaptive for the cognitive system to inhibit an activated response if a target requiring that response is not presented immediately after prime activation.
Free-Choice Priming

Accounts of Fixed and Free-Choice Priming
Whether activation-then-inhibition is the cause of NCEs is currently the subject of debate. NCEs most commonly occur with arrow stimuli and arrow masks, leading some researchers to claim that the masks themselves induce activation of prime-incongruent responses (for a review see Kiesel, Berner, & Kunde, 2008) . Given that the locus of NCEs is still under debate, our experiment focused on PCEs. Fixed and free-choice PCEs have generally been attributed to a prospective activation-based mechanism in which presentation of a masked prime activates and initially biases its corresponding response. Participants are faster to respond on congruent trials because the target requires the same response, whereas on incongruent trials the prime-biased response must be overcome. On free-choice trials, the ambiguous target does not contradict the prime-biased response, hence the prime biases responses toward it.
Accounts of PCEs differ largely with respect to the acquisition of the prime-induced bias. At one extreme is the claim that masked primes are automatically processed to both semantic and motor-response levels (e.g., Dehaene et al., 1998; Reynvoet, Gevers, & Caessens, 2005) . At the other extreme is the claim that masked primes must be experienced as targets to allow stimulus-response links to be formed before primes will automatically induce response priming (e.g., Damian, 2001 ). The occurrence of priming for stimuli that were never presented as targets challenges the latter claim (e.g., Reynvoet et al., 2005) . An intermediate claim is that masked primes do not function automatically but also do not have to be presented as targets to induce response priming. According to Kunde, Kiesel, and Hoffmann's (2003; see also Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) action-trigger account, stimuli that are either experienced consciously or are otherwise mentally expected by the participant gain the status of automatic action triggers.
As mentioned earlier, Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004) and Klapp and Haas (2005) obtained free-choice priming only when free-choice trials were mixed with fixed trials. This result challenges the automatic motor-response account, but fits well with the stimulus-response linking and action-trigger accounts. However, the latter two accounts share the notion that once the same primes and targets have been presented repeatedly, primes should automatically activate their corresponding responses as long as the same action trigger (or task set) remains in effect. The finding that free-choice priming did not occur following a block of fixed trials in which stimulus-response links or action triggers would have been formed suggests that free-choice priming is highly context dependent (i.e., on the current action triggers or task set). This notion fits well with the demonstrations of proportion effects on masked priming described next.
Proportion Effects on Masked Priming
The claim that masked priming reflects an invariant automatic activation-based process is challenged by many findings, including that priming effects are larger when a higher proportion of trials involve congruent/related primes as opposed to incongruent/unrelated primes. Proportion effects on masked priming have now been reported in tasks involving words (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001) , numbers (e.g., Bodner & Dypvik, 2005) , and nonalphanumeric stimuli (e.g., Jaskowski, Skalska, & Verleger, 2003) . Of particular relevance here, Klapp (2007) reported a proportion congruence (PC) effect with arrow stimuli: PCEs with arrow stimuli increased as the PC increased from .2 to .5 to .8. At longer SOAs, where NCEs are observed, Klapp also found that facilitation from incongruent primes over congruent primes increased as the proportion of incongruent trials increased from .2 to .5 to .8. Klapp (2007) interpreted the PC effect with arrow stimuli as evidence for an adaptive automatic control mechanism, one that is sensitive to the mixture of primes and targets experienced in a task. Essentially, he suggested that prime activation increases when the PC is higher. An alternative possibility is that reliance on prime processing increases when the PC is higher. According to the memory-recruitment account (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001) , the processing applied to masked primes is encoded in memory and is then recruited to assist with target processing if the list context (e.g., the PC) supports its recruitment. Thus, PC effects may be consistent with either a contextually sensitive prospective or retrospective mechanism.
Will the Proportion of Congruent Fixed Trials Affect Free-Choice Priming?
Our experiment examined whether the PC of fixed trials influences the magnitude of free-choice priming. Does unconscious attunement to masked primes in one task (i.e., fixed choices) carry over to another task (i.e., free choices)? Effects of PC on fixed and/or free-choice priming would show that arrow primes do not activate their responses in an invariant manner. Instead, these effects would suggest that context influences the amount of prime activation (i.e., a prospective view) or the extent of recruitment of the processing operations applied during the encoding of masked primes (i.e., a retrospective view).
Participants in our experiment received a mixture of fixed trials (60% of all trials) and free-choice trials (40% of all trials). Primes were presented for 30 ms and were premasked and postmasked by letter strings each shown for 75 ms; the prime-target SOA was 105 ms. Even though NCEs are usually found at this SOA (e.g., Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2000) , Kiesel et al. (2006, Experiment 1) obtained PCEs under these conditions, hence we expected to obtain PCEs. On fixed trials, primes and targets were left or right double arrows (<< or >>). On free-choice trials, primes were again double arrows but the free-choice target was a bidirectional arrow (< >). Across groups, the proportion of fixed trials with congruent primes (i.e., the PC) was .8 or .2.
On fixed trials, we expected to obtain a PCE and to replicate Klapp's (2007) finding of a PC effect on fixed priming. On free-choice trials, we expected to replicate the two freechoice priming effects reported by Schlaghecken and Eimer (2004) and Kiesel et al. (2006) : Faster prime-congruent responses than prime-incongruent responses and abovechance selection of prime-congruent responses. The novel question is whether the PC effect on fixed trials would carry over to affect free-choice trials. If so, then free-choice priming should also be greater in the .8 PC group than in the .2 PC group. As described below, following Kunde (2003) , we also conducted some post hoc analyses to determine whether PC effects on fixed and/or free-choice priming would be modulated by whether the previous trial (i.e., the ''local context'') was a free-choice, incongruent, or congruent trial.
Method Participants
Seventy undergraduates at the University of Calgary were randomly assigned to either the .2 or .8 PC group (35 per group).
Materials and Design
The primes and fixed targets were left or right double arrows (<< or >>); the free-choice target was a bidirectional arrow (< >). Each participant received 5 blocks of 100 trials. The first block was treated as practice and was not analyzed, as in Kiesel et al. (2006) . Each block contained 60 fixed trials and 40 free-choice trials. In the .2 PC group, .2 of the fixed trials involved congruent primes (i.e., 12 of the 60) and .8 involved incongruent primes (i.e., 48 of the 60), and vice versa for the .8 PC group. Half of the fixed trials involved a left target, half involved a right target. Half the free-choice trials in each block were preceded by a left prime and half by a right prime. The trials in each block were randomly mixed for each participant.
Procedure
Stimuli were presented by a Macintosh onto a computer monitor in 72-point courier black font against a light gray background. Premasks and postmasks consisted of strings of five consonants in uppercase letters (excluding K, X, V, M, N, Y, and W due to their arrow-like angles) that were randomly generated for each trial. Each trial consisted of a premask (75 ms), a prime (30 ms), a postmask (75 ms), and a target that remained on the screen until a response; each ISI was 0 ms, thus the prime-target SOA was 105 ms. On fixed trials, participants pressed the left or right key on a response box using the corresponding index finger. On free-choice trials, they were told that they should ''freely and randomly'' choose which of these keys to press. If a response on any trial exceeded 1 s, a ''TOO SLOW'' prompt was presented for 1 s. Accuracy feedback was not provided. Each block was separated by a self-paced break.
After the main experiment, participants were asked ''What did you see on each trial, just before the target was presented?'' (and appropriate follow-up questions) to assess their subjective awareness of the primes. Participants were then informed that a masked left or right double arrow had preceded each target in the main experiment. They then completed a prime-judgment task in which they tried to identify the direction of the prime rather than the target under the same trial specifications used in the main experiment. Each participant received 50 congruent and 50 incongruent fixed trials (half with a left target, half with a right target) and 50 free-choice trials in a random order. Half of each type of trial involved a left prime and half involved a right prime. Accuracy feedback was not provided.
Results
Trials with RTs below 150 ms or above 3,000 ms were excluded from analysis (0.4%). Effects were significant at the .05 level unless otherwise noted. Table 1 shows the means and priming scores across all fixed trials, for RTs based on accurate responses, and the error rates. Each dependent measure was analyzed using a mixed-factor ANOVA with prime type (congruent vs. incongruent) as the within-group factor and PC (.2 vs. .8) as the between-groups factor.
Fixed Priming
In the (reaction time) RT analysis, the .8 PC group was somewhat faster than the .2 PC group overall (401 ms vs. 420 ms) but this main effect of PC did not reach significance, F(1, 68) = 2.30, MSE = 5,514, p = .13. A main effect of prime type was found, reflecting faster responses on congruent than incongruent trials (i.e., a PCE; 402 ms vs. 420 ms), F(1, 68) = 56.17, MSE = 203. Replicating Klapp (2007) , the interaction between priming and PC was also significant: Priming on fixed trials was greater when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (28 ms vs. 8 ms), F(1, 68) = 17.72, MSE = 203. Follow-up tests showed that fixed priming was significant whether the PC was .8, F(1, 34) = 48.02, MSE = 290, or .2, F(1, 34) = 9.41, MSE = 117.
The error-rate analysis replicated the RT analysis pattern. The main effect of PC was marginal, reflecting somewhat more errors when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (5.8% vs.
3.8%), F(1, 68) = 3.15, MSE = 47.2, p = .08. The main effect of prime type was significant (6.1% errors on incongruent trials vs. 3.4% errors on congruent trials), F(1, 68) = 11.16, MSE = 22.5. The interaction was also significant: The priming effect was greater in the .8 PC group than in the .2 PC group (5.5% vs. À0.1%), F(1, 68) = 12.38, MSE = 22.5. Follow-up tests showed that more errors were made on incongruent than congruent trials in the .8 PC group (8.6% vs. 3.1%), F(1, 34) = 13.79, MSE = 38.4, but not in the .2 PC group (3.7% vs. 3.8%), F < 1.
Proportion effects with masked primes often show a signature bias pattern: When the proportion of valid-prime trials is .8 (vs. .2), responses on valid-prime trials are faster, but error rates on invalid-prime trials are also greater (Bodner & Dypvik, 2005; Bodner & Masson, 2001; Bodner, Masson, & Richard, 2006) . This pattern also occurred in our experiment. The RTs on congruent trials were shorter when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (387 ms vs. 416 ms), F(1, 68) = 5.18, MSE = 2,877, whereas the RTs on incongruent trials were not affected by PC (415 ms vs. 424 ms), F < 1. In contrast, the error rate on incongruent trials was greater when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (8.6% vs. 3.7%), F(1, 68) = 6.78, MSE = 61.6, whereas the error rate on congruent trials was similar across these PCs (3.1% vs. 3.8%), F(1, 68) = 1.25, MSE = 8.2, p = .27. Table 2 shows the mean RTs for free-choice responses that were congruent versus incongruent with the prime, and priming scores, as well as the percentage of free-choice trials in which the prime response was chosen. The RTs were analyzed using a mixed-factor ANOVA with response type (prime-congruent vs. prime-incongruent) as the repeatedmeasures factor and the PC of fixed trials (.2 vs. .8) as the between-groups factor. The .8 PC group made marginally faster free-choice responses than the .2 PC group overall (432 ms vs. 461 ms), F(1, 68) = 3.39, MSE = 8,425, p = .07. Prime-congruent free choices were faster than prime-incongruent free choices (441 ms vs. 452 ms) producing a significant main effect of response type, F(1, 68) = 15.39, MSE = 301. Our critical finding was an interaction between response type and PC: The facilitation of prime-congruent responses relative to prime-incongruent responses (i.e., free-choice priming) was greater when PC was .8 rather than .2 (21 ms vs. 2 ms), F(1, 68) = 9.64, MSE = 301. Free-choice priming was significant when PC was .8 (422 ms vs. 442 ms), F(1, 34) = 24.94, MSE = 299, but not when it was .2 (460 ms vs. 462 ms), F < 1.
Free-Choice Priming
The bias-pattern signature also occurred on free-choice trials. Participants chose prime-congruent responses faster when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (422 ms vs. 460 ms), F(1, 68) = 5.42, MSE = 4,585, whereas trials where participants chose the prime-incongruent response were not reliably affected by the PC (442 ms vs. 462 ms), F(1, 68) = 1.60, MSE = 4,142, p = .21.
We also found an influence of PC on the percentage of free-choice responses that were congruent with the prime. Participants were more likely to choose the primed response when the PC was .8 rather than .2 (54.1% vs. 49.1%), F(1, 68) = 19.45, MSE = 21.9. Moreover, the .8 PC group chose the primed response more often than chance, t(34) = 3.98, SE = 1.02, whereas the .2 PC group chose it marginally less often than chance, t(34) = 1.90, SE = 0.46, p = .07. Kunde (2003) reported that the PCE was reduced when the prime on the previous trial was incongruent rather than congruent. This sequential modulation occurred only when the prime on the previous trial was presented long enough for participants to become aware of it. We conducted post hoc analyses to examine whether the previous trial type (freechoice vs. incongruent vs. congruent) modulated the effects Note. SEs appear in parentheses.
Previous Trial Analyses
of PC on fixed and free-choice priming. The PC manipulation resulted in an average of only 5-6 trials per participant of certain two-trial sequences (incongruent-incongruent in the .8 PC group and congruent-congruent in the .2 PC group), hence the three-way Prime Type · PC · Previous Trial interactions did not typically reach significance due to the variability. Nonetheless, we tested the PC effect for each type of previous trial. The relevant means appear in Tables 1 (fixed trials) and 2 (free-choice trials).
In the RT measure, the fixed priming advantage when PC was .8 rather than .2 held when the previous trial was a freechoice trial (35 ms vs. 9 ms), F(1, 68) = 7.68, MSE = 1,486, or an incongruent trial (33 ms vs. 4 ms), F(1, 67) = 6.04, MSE = 2,372, but not when it was a congruent trial (24 ms vs. 21 ms), F < 1. In the error measure, this PC effect held when the previous trial was a free-choice trial (6.3% vs. À1.5%), F(1, 68) = 12.24, MSE = 87.6, was marginal when it was a congruent trial (5.7% vs. 1.3%), F(1, 68) = 3.81, MSE = 87.7, p = .06, and was not significant when it was an incongruent trial (2.5% vs. 0.8%), F < 1.09.
The RT measure for the free priming advantage when PC was .8 rather than .2 followed the fixed priming pattern: This PC effect held when the previous trial was a free-choice trial (17 ms vs. 4 ms), F(1, 68) = 4.18, MSE = 794, or an incongruent trial (32 ms vs. 0 ms), F(1, 68) = 5.19, MSE = 3,340, but not when it was a congruent trial (20 ms vs. 14 ms), F < 1. The same pattern occurred in the prime-congruent response rate: It was greater when PC was .8 versus .2 when the previous trial was a free-choice trial (54.8% vs. 48.4%), F(1, 68) = 16.25, MSE = 43.8, or an incongruent trial (53.0% vs. 48.7%), F(1, 68) = 4.59, MSE = 69.6, but not when it was a congruent trial (53.7% vs. 53.2%), F < 1; these rates were above chance for each trial type in the .8 PC group (p = .09 for incongruent trials), but at chance for each trial type in the .2 PC group.
In contrast to Kunde (2003) , we found that the type of previous trial can modulate masked priming effects, even when the primes on that trial were masked. As discussed below, these sequential modulations of PC effects suggest that certain local contexts can override the effects of a more global (i.e., list-wide) context. Klapp and Hinkley (2002) reported a positive correlation of .73 between fixed and free-choice priming, suggesting the two types of priming have a common origin. We also obtained significant positive correlations between our priming measures: fixed priming in the RTs and free-choice priming, r(68) = .52; fixed priming in the errors and freechoice priming, r(68) = .53; fixed priming in the RTs and fixed priming in the errors, r(68) = .53; prime-congruent responses and fixed priming in the RTs, r(68) = .51; prime-congruent responses and fixed priming in the errors, r(68) = .67; and prime-congruent responses and free priming, r(68) = .52.
Correlations Between Priming Measures
Measures of Mask Effectiveness
On the prime awareness question, 57 participants did not report any awareness of the primes (81.4%), 10 reported noticing a flickering between the masks but did not report seeing arrow primes (14.3%), and 3 reported seeing the arrow primes on at least one trial (4.3%). On the primejudgment task, participants' ability to discriminate the direction of the masked primes was minimal, yet the mean d' of .07 (hit rate = 51.4%, false alarm rate = 48.6%) was above zero, t(69) = 2.30, SE = 0.03. However, d' did not correlate significantly with either fixed priming, r(68) = .04, or freechoice priming, r(68) = .11 (this was also true separately for the .2 PC group, r(68) = À.14 and À.12, and the .8 PC group, r(68) = À.06 and .16). Discrimination was greater in the .8 PC group than in the .2 PC group (.14 vs. .004), F(1, 68) = 5.01, MSE = .06; follow-up one-sample t tests revealed that d 0 was above chance in the .8 PC group, t(34) = 3.14, SE = 0.04, but not in the .2 PC group, t(34) = 0.10, SE = 0.04.
Discussion
We examined the influence of masked arrow primes on responses to both fixed and free-choice targets at a short prime-target SOA. Replicating Klapp (2007) , the benefit from congruent primes on fixed trials (i.e., a PCE) was greater when the list-wide PC was .8 rather than .2. Our new finding was that the PC of the fixed trials also influenced free-choice responses. The .8 PC group -but not the .2 PC group -chose the primed response more often than chance and was also faster to make prime-congruent than prime-incongruent responses. As discussed below, we also found that the local context (i.e., the nature of the previous trial) modulated these PC effects. Replicating Klapp and Hinkley (2002) , our measures of fixed and free-choice priming were positively correlated, suggesting a common mechanism underlies both effects. Before discussing what this common mechanism might be, a comment on the effectiveness of our masking procedure is warranted. As in Klapp (2007) , our participants were above chance in our prime-judgment task, and our .8 PC group slightly outperformed the .2 PC group on this task. The greater influence of masked primes in the .8 PC group during the main experiment thus carried over to affect prime judgments. We do not take this above-chance discrimination as an indication of prime awareness. Almost all of our participants (96%) reported not being aware of the primes or that the primes were arrows prior to the prime-judgment task, and better discrimination was not associated with increased fixed or free-choice priming. Instead, we view this result as evidence that the unconscious influence of PC can extend to a subsequent block of trials. This finding contrasts with demonstrations that masked priming in a block of fixed trials does not extend to a block of free-choice trials (Klapp & Haas, 2005; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) . The change in target type across blocks in these studies may have changed subjects' task set or reliance on action triggers, thus eliminating priming. Alternatively, priming might extend to a free-choice block, despite the change in target type, if a high PC were used in the fixed trial block.
In contrast to these global effects of list-wide PC, we found that the PC effects on fixed and free priming were remarkably sensitive to particular local contexts. Specifically, when the previous trial was congruent, robust priming occurred regardless of the global PC, whereas the global PC modulated priming when the previous trial was incongruent or a free choice. A local context that supports prime use (a congruent trial) therefore counteracted the influence of an unsupportive global context (a .2 PC). In contrast, a local context that did not support prime use (an incongruent trial) did not counteract a supportive global context (a .8 PC). Although this asymmetry requires replication (particularly given the absence of PC · Priming · Previous Trial interactions), it provides two hints about the mechanism driving PC effects. First, it appears to be sensitive to both local (previous trial) and more global contexts. Second, it appears to be influenced by local prime congruence more than by local prime incongruence.
Although our data do not by themselves adjudicate between an adaptive activation mechanism and a memoryrecruitment mechanism, we suggest that these mechanism attributes fit well with the memory-recruitment account's claim that masked-prime recruitment is determined by the validity (cf. invalidity) of the local prime context (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001; Bodner et al., 2006) . In addition, the similarity of proportion effects on fixed priming across stimulus domains testing different types of masked priming fits particularly well with this account (see Bodner & Dypvik, 2005) . This account suggests that the .8 PC group is more likely than the .2 PC group to recruit the processing applied to the masked primes to aid with target processing. This increased reliance on prior prime processing facilitated RTs on congruent trials, but also resulted in more errors on incongruent trials -a bias-pattern signature reported here and in Klapp (2007) . The same bias pattern occurs even when all trials are response congruent and even when each stimulus occurs only once (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001; Bodner et al., 2006) .
That fixed and free priming were influenced by PC challenges activation-based accounts that posit that masked primes activate their corresponding responses in an invariant manner, either without training as in the motor-response account (Dehaene et al., 1998) or after training as in the stimulus-response learning account (Damian, 2001 ). The alternative possibility is that the PC effects on fixed and free-choice priming are indicative of an adaptive automatic activation process. For example, Klapp (2007) suggested that the association between each prime and its response increases when PC is greater, through increased learning and/or improved retention due to the more frequent occurrence of congruent trials. However, Klapp also suggested that this associationbased account predicts PC effects only if primes have acquired associations with particular responses during the experiment (rather than applying globally to all stimuli of a given class). While plausible, such a mechanism cannot be used to explain the existence of proportion effects in paradigms where stimuli are never repeated and where prime-target pairs are always response congruent (e.g., Bodner & Masson, 2001; Bodner et al., 2006) .
The PC effects reported here also have relevance for the claim that masked priming is controlled by participants' action triggers or task sets (e.g., Kunde et al., 2003; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004) . It is unclear why action triggers or task sets would have differed for the two PC groups, given that both groups experienced the same targets and performed the same tasks. Moreover, that PC effects were influenced by the congruency of the previous trial suggests the influence of a very locally sensitive mechanism. Nonetheless, it could be argued that action triggers and task sets are strongly affected by the nature of the prime on the previous trial.
The Adaptation to the Statistics of the Environment (ASE) account of prime-proportion effects offered by Kinoshita, Forster, and Mozer (2008) provides an example of a decision-based mechanism that is adaptive and locally sensitive. According to the ASE account, the cognitive system tracks current and recent trial difficulty and automatically adjusts the timing of response decisions to maximize response efficiency. Whether free-choice trials are deemed ''easy'' or ''difficult'' is unclear, but our finding that PC effects were absent following an ''easy'' congruent trial may lend some support to the viability of this account (but see Bodner & Johnson, 2009 ). Thus, whether PC effects reflect differences in memory recruitment, activation, or decision processes remains an open and lively debate.
Masked primes influence responses to ambiguous targets. An open question for future research is whether a PC effect on free choices will occur if the free-choice target is perceptually distinct from both the masked arrow primes and fixed-choice targets (e.g., a circle). If prime use obligatorily increases when PC is higher, then the features of the freechoice target might not matter. On the other hand, a perceptually distinct free-choice target might not cue prime use. On this question, Schlaghecken, Klapp, and Maylor (2009) recently reported an NCE on free choices to a circle target, suggesting that free-choice priming does not require perceptual prime-target similarity. Whether free-choice priming to a circle target occurs under conditions that produce a PCE, or is modulated by the PC of fixed trials, remains to be tested. We do not yet know the boundary conditions on the unconscious manipulation of free choices.
